You and I share a common enemy. I hate that copyright troll shit Marc Randazza. I saw that he filed a domain name dispute against you in the CAC. I am pretty sure that the connection he has with the Czech Republic is that his wife is Czech. Since he obviously has some sort of criminal ties, I wouldn't be shocked if it was that far-reaching.
At any rate, I've dealt with these kinds of things before, and I thought I would offer you a bit of help since I know first-hand how expensive these things can get. I got a copy of his complaint, and I did a lot of research for you and put together a response for you to argue to the CAC that the complaint against you should be dismissed. I hope that it helps you out. Good luck to you.
Complainant Marc Randazza has improperly filed a UDRP complaint with the Czech Arbitration Center. Jurisdiction in the CAC is not proper because neither the respondent nor the complainant have ties to the Czech Republic. In addition, Complainant Marc Randazza has ties to illegal activity and Ms. Cox has a right to freedom of speech.
In late 2011, complainant Marc Randazza approached respondent, Ms. Crystal Cox, about representing her in an appeal of a judgment against her in the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Randazza then went behind Ms. Cox's back and began speaking with the opposing party without Ms. Cox's permission, and Ms. Cox terminated their professional relationship. Cox has absolute evidence that Randazza conspired to set her up in a criminal case and that he conspired with the corrupt judge in the case so that her rights would be violated. For this reason alone, the complaint must be dismissed.
Randazza has known ties to organized crime, is a criminal, and is suspected of participation in a number of unethical acts. He has been a representative of the pornography industry, thus demonstrating a lack of moral character. In his representation of pornographers, he has set up Gay teenagers for suicide, has extorted millions of dollars from innocent parties, and uses his law license as a tool of cyber bullying, terrorism, and criminal activity. This prosecution is the latest in a long line of his incredible acts of moral turpitude and crime. Not only should the complaint be denied, but the Czech Arbitration Court should impose sanctions upon Randazza under Czech Code which provides for sanctions of attorneys who bring frivolous actions against innocent parties.
1. Elliot Bernstein is not a proper party to this case.
Elliot Bernstein is not a proper party to this case, and for that reason the claims should be denied. Bernstein is the registered name owner of two of the domain names, but as the Court can see, Cox is the publisher of them. BUT, the actual case has to be brought against the real name holder or the party in interest, but it is up to the Complainant to make that distinction. Under ICANN Rule 126.96.36.199, Randazza could have simply asked Bernstein to reveal the underlying owner, and Bernstein would have done so. But, since Randazza was too lazy to do this, his complaint has a fatal flaw that can never be overcome.
2. Jurisdiction in the Czech Republic is not proper because neither party meets the sufficient minimal contacts test.
Due Process requires that, in order for a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that "he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend „traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‟" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). Because neither Randazza nor Cox reside in the Czech Republic, this court has no jurisdiction over either of them, nor over this dispute.
The Supreme Court of the United States (A country of which both Randazza and Cox are citizens) has held that before a court has the power to exert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must "Purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
The minimum contacts constitutional requirement serves two objectives: "[I]t protects against the burdens of litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum" unless the defendants contacts to the forum state make it just and fair to force him or her to defend a cause of action, and "it acts to ensure that the states, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal system." See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
Plaintiff Randazza seeks exactly what the due process clause prohibits, a discard of any notion of due process in order to punitively subject the Cox to litigation in an inconvenient forum.
DUE PROCESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CYBER JOURNALISM
As noted above, the Plaintiff's position demonstrates a a desire to continue unethical behavior to set up the Defendant. Randazza might thing that due process is not due to Cox, this is not the case in real life or on the Internet. Using technology to lead to "the eventual demise on all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction" can not stand. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). To determine jurisdiction in the Internet age, the Court must recognize that the Internet is not restricted by distance or state boundaries. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) ("Cyberspace is accessible to anyone, located anywhere, with an Internet connection").
The world wide nature of Internet use makes it a unique mode of communication unlike newspapers, mail, radio, television, and other media. See Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F.Supp.2d 907, 914(D. Or. 1999). Speech on the Internet targets no jurisdiction in particular and everyone in any geographic location. See Id.
Given Internet, and the special position granted to matters of free speech, the Court must recognize that this case touches upon time-worn legal issues in a manner not thoroughly resolved the existing law. See generally, David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996) ("Cyberspace has no territorial based boundaries, because of the cost and speed of message transmission on the Internet is almost entirely independent of physical location").
THE "EFFECTS TEST"
The predominant pre-internet test for jurisdiction, occasionally relied upon in the internet context is the effects test as established by Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In this case, an editor and a writer for the National Enquirer, both residents of Florida, were sued in California for libel arising out of an article published in The Enquirer about Shirley Jones, a resident of California. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The United States Supreme Court upheld the determination of personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they had "expressly aimed" their conduct towards California. Id. at 789.
A key distinction in the case at bar is that the The National Enquirer was availing itself of the privilege of operating in California, as it shipped 600,000 copies into that state.
If this court were to accept a simplistic interpretation of Calder in an Internet context, a nonresident defendant would always be subject to jurisdiction in the Czech Arbitration Court simply because the plaintiff's wanted to bring a claim in the Czech Arbitration Court. See, e.g., Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec.
THE "ZIPPO TEST"
Many courts have taken notice of the unique qualities of the Internet when making decisions regarding personal jurisdiction. The most commonly used approach to determine whether purposeful availment exists in a Website context is the so-called "Zippo Test." This Test was originally articulated in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
At the opposite end of the spectrum are simple passive Websites which are merely accessible by users in all jurisdictions. These passive Websites do little more than make information available to any who may be interested in receiving the information and do not create sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction to attach. See Zippo at 1124 (citing Bensusan Rest Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 404, 409 (ND Miss. 2000) (publication of allegedly defamatory material on a website, under the due process clause, does not create sufficient contacts with the forum state since the site was passive and not designed to attract business); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (web page accessible in the forum state, causing potential harm in the forum state does not create liability in the forum state).
In the middle are interactive Websites where users can exchange information with the host site. In all but the clearest cases, an evaluating court must make a finding that the defendant is somehow expressly targeting internet users in the forum state and not just making itself accessible to everyone. Mere interactivity, without more does not slide the scale toward establishment of minimum contacts.
The purposeful availment requirement is established if the defendant purposefully creates sufficient minimum contacts with Florida in order to create "a substantial connection" with this state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76. The whole constitutional reason for "purposeful availment" requirement is so that the decisions of all states have some measure of predictability and notice that they may be subject to suit in a foreign jurisdiction. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, at 297 (1980). If citizens believe that the risks of litigation in a fora are too likely, citizens of other states may sever any connection to unfavorable forum states. Id. at 297.
As discussed above, since Cox is technologically unable to limit where in the world her cyber-journalism and Citizen Journalism would be accessed, it is a pre-internet mode of thinking that the defendant could have severed connection to the Czech Republic to avoid jurisdiction here. This is simply illogical in the context of allowing free-expression to thrive without unreasonably and unlawfully chilling all speech on the internet.
Neither Ms. Cox nor attorney Randazza have the minimum contacts necessary to meet the test described in International Shoe. Attorney Randazza currently lives in Nevada, and his law firm is in Florida (and how that is ethical is uncertain). Ms. Cox is a resident of Montana. Neither of them has a connection to the Czech Republic, and Ms. Cox is certainly not "at home" in the Czech Republic. Therefore, the Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes does not have personal jurisdiction over either party, and filing the complaint in the Czech Republic was not proper.
2. Because Complainant Marc Randazza has ties to illegal activity, he cannot claim legitimate rights to his name as a famous mark.
The doctrine that plaintiff must come into a court of equity with "clean hands" is a reflection of the equitable nature of trademark law. A plaintiff who requests the assistance of a court of equity must not himself be guilty of inequitable conduct. Furthermore, keeping in mind the equitable nature of trademark rights, "misuse" of those rights is a recognized defense.
In his complaint, Randazza claims that he has shown that his name is a trademark because he is a public individual. HE IS a public individual, and thus his name might function as a trademark, but his name is also associated with pornography, criminality, slander, and libel. Therefore, under New York Times v. Sullivan, in order for him to win this case, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Cox acted with actual malice, knowing that her actions could constitute a violation of law. Since her actions had no violation of law in them, there is no possibility that Randazza can ever prevail over her under this standard.
Further, because of Randazza's obvious ties with the mafia, he is not using his name in a legitimate manner. Ms. Cox is in fear for her life because of Randazza's ties with the Mafia. Additionally, he has sent out a ring of bloggers and stalkers to harass Ms. Cox constantly. Most notably, someone connected to Randazza threatened to break Ms. Cox's legs in a conspiracy with the well-known criminal, Kenneth White, who is a blatant apologist for Randazza. Therefore, Randazza is not making a legitimate use of his name and should not be entitled to rights to it.
Common antitrust misuse defense alleges that the suit brought by plaintiff was brought in bad faith as part of an attempt to monopolize or restrain trade or to shut down or set up an innocent party. A Plaintiff may try to combat this defense by claiming immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under this doctrine, the plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts, which immunizes him from antitrust liability based on his filing suit against defendant.
The immunity conferred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, is not absolute. There is an exception to the doctrine known as the "sham exception": if the lawsuit is a mere sham brought to harass a competitor and damage competition, it will not qualify for Noerr-Pennington immunity. Furthermore, a "no sham" ruling does not bar a later malicious prosecution suit based on false testimony not addressed by the court in the initial "no sham" ruling.
The meaning of the "sham" exception was clarified by the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in the Columbia Pictures case. There, the Court set out a two-part test for sham:
1. the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant would realistically expect success on the merits; and
2. the baseless lawsuit must conceal an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of government process.
Randazza is clearly trying to interefere directly with Cox and her business relationships. As has been demonstrated by Cox on many occasions, Randazza is a criminal minded and unethical attorney. He has conspired to set her up for extortion. He has worked with her enemies while her attorney and violated the sacred oath of attorney client privilege! How can anything ever be as unclean handed and underhanded, and
3. Because the European Union recognizes freedom of speech, Marc Randazza should not be allowed to take the Disputed Domain Name from Ms. Cox.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 11 provides that "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." and "2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected."
Respondent Ms. Cox is an investigative journalist who has made it her life's work to provide truthful information to the public about individuals who have acted improperly. She has a number of successful blogs where she disseminates this information to the public. She is a whistleblower and an agent of the truth. COX IS A MINISTER, and thus NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT.
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar suits brought against Ministers, as does the Czech Constitution and the United Nations treaty on civil rights.
Government interference with a Minister is an impermissible mixture of church and state. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich,426 U. S. 696. Pp. 10-12.
(c) Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other employment discrimination laws, Courts find that suits against Ministers on matters of religious conviction are can not be maintained. The First Amendment itself, gives special solicitude to the rights of religious clergy members, of which Cox is obviously one (the domains are owned by REVEREND Crystal Cox!)
Because Cox is a legitimate minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this claim. The ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation.
This court should dismiss the complaint because Randazza made an error about the parties, jurisdiction is not proper in the Czech Republic, Randazza is involved with illegal activity, and Ms. Cox has a right to freedom of speech, Cox is a religious minister and thus immune from suit."